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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
HUBER ~ ROWLAND CONSTRUCTION Co.,

Plaintiff and Appellant

Case No.
vs.

8766

CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE,

Defendent and Respondent

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 22, 1954, appellant entered into a contract with respondent, in which appellant agreed to
perform certain work for respondent, consisting principally of construction of sidewalk, curb and gutter,
the said project being known as South Salt Lake Special Improvement District #'5. All of the work required by the contract to be performed by appellant was
completed by Sept. 12, 1955, including the removal
of 64,904 square feet of old sidewalk as required by
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the contract. The price agreed to be paid for the performance of the said work was the contract unit bid
price per item, as shown in the Proposal, for the
quantities of work actually performed. The contract,
and contract documents specifically made a part of the
contract, including the Proposal, Instructions to Bidders, and Specifications, were received into evidence
and designated as part of the record on this appeal.
The Proposal includes the bid price for all of the work
to be performed, except that it does not specifically
include an item for sidewalk removal. Respondent
contended that the item of "Structural Excavation"
included the removal of old sidewalk. The Specifications define "Structural Excavation" as follows:
STRUCTURAL EXCAVATION
2.4.1. Description. Structural excavation
shall include the performance of all operations
incidental to the excavation of earth and rock,
of whatever kind, for structures on this project.
It shall include backfill and embankment of excavated material, the disposal of all material not
required, or not suitable for backfill or embankment, and the cleanup and restoration of surfaces except as hereinafter specifically provided.
It is appellant· s contention that an itern of sidewalk
removal was omitted from the Proposal either through
inadvertence or mistake, and that no price being agreed
upon for such work, it is entitled to a reasonable price.
On Sept. 6, 1956, appellant commenced an action in
the District Court for the Third Judicial District,
State of Utah, for payment for the removal of such old
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sidewalk alleging that a reasonable price was 5¢ per
square foot, or a total of $3,245.20. Trial was held
on Sept. 20, 19 57 in the District Court, the court
sitting without a jury. The trial court found that
payment of $600.75 for sidewalk removal was made
to appellant at the rate of 75¢ per cubic yard, the
contract price for structural excavation, for 801 cubic
yards, the equivalent of 64,904 square feet of 4-inch
sidewalk. The trial court further found that there
is no trade practice or custom in the construction industry requiring a construction of the contract different from, or in modification of, the written contract,
and found as a matter of law, from a construction of
the contract, that the sidewalk removal was a part of
the excavation work covered by the contract. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment for the respondent, no cause of action, on the First Cause of Action,
for the removal of the old sidewalk. The trial made
no findings of fact on the other issues as set out in
the Pre-Trial Order on the First Cause of Action, as
to whether or not there was an accord and satisfaction,
or the reasonable price per square foot for the removal
of the old sidewalk.
Appellant accepts the findings of fact of the trial
court as being correct, but believes that the conclusions of law from a construction of the contract are
incorrect, and since the Judgment on the Second Cause
of Action and defendant's Counterclaim are not appealed from, the only issue presented to this Court on
this appeal is, therefore, whether or not the trial court
erred in construing the contract, concerning payment
for sidewalk removal.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT, IN ITS INTERPRETA~
TION OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN APPELLANT
AND RESPONDENT, ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION OF
LAW THAT THE SIDEWALK REMOVAL WAS APART
OF THE EXCAVATION WORK COVERED BY THE
CONTRACT.

ARGUMENT
The first question to be disposed of is, does the
definition of "Structural Excavation'' include theremoval of man-made concrete structures. The specifications quoted above, page 2, state that structural excavation shall include the performance of all operations incidental to the excavation of "earth and rock"
of whatever kind. The term "rock" is defined in Web~
ster's International Dictionary, 2nd Edition as:
3. Geol. Solid mineral matter of any kind
occuring naturally (emphasis added) in large
quantities or forming a considerable part of the
earth's mass; also, a particular mass or kind of
such material. Rock may be consolidated or
unconsolidated, and composed of one mineral
or, more commonly, of two or more; or it
may be to a greater or less extent of organic
origin, as coal . . ..
In City of Chicago v. Duffy, 117 Ill. App. 26 L
the court said "The term 'rock' in ordinary language is
the stony matter which constitutes earth's crust as
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distinguished from clayt gravet sandt peat, etc.u To
the same effect is Okey v. Moyes, 91 NW 771, 117
Iowa 514. 19 Encyclopedia Britannica 364t 14th Edition, says:
''Rockt in geology a mass of the mineral
matter of which the crust of the earth is composed. In more general usage a 'rock' is a large
mass of this mineral matter, as distinguished
from smaller pieces, 'stones' ".
From the foregoing citations, it is too clear to warrant further discussion that the term "rocktt does not
comprehend man-made concrete sidewalk.
Nevertheless, the trial court found that payment
was in fact made for sidewalk removal at the price
agreed upon for structural excavation, and found as
a matter of law, that the contract provided that such
sidewalk removal was a part of such excavation. It
is difficult to understand upon what basis such a
conclusion could be reached.
If the removal of the old sidewalk was not ineluded in any of the items scheduled in the Proposal,
it becomes necessary to determine if it was the intent
of the parties, as found in the contract, that no payment should be made for any work required by the
contract, but not specifically included in any of the
items in the Proposal.

It is important here to distinguish between minor
details and work incidental to other prescribed work,
and wholly separate work which is not incidental to
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other work. For example, it would be understood by
everyone that where it is prescribed that a certain concrete structure be constructed, that incidental to such
work would be the erection of forms necessary to pouring the concrete. But this is quite a different thing from
simply prescribing the construction of a concrete structure, and then contending that major excavation to
establish a proper elevation for the structure is incidental to this work, particularly where excavation is
separately provided for. It is the latter situation at
issue here. The removal of old sidewalk was necessary to establish proper grades for the new sidewalk,
and the only provisions for payment for structural
excavation so define structural excavation as to expressly exclude sidewalk removal, so that it cannot
be contended that the sidewalk removal was incidental
to such work.
If it were the intent of the parties, however, there
would be no problems or difficulties in a contract
which might provide, for example, that the contractor
shall do excavation, remove trees, and construct sidewalk, and that for such excavation, removal, and construction, the contractor should be paid so much a
yard for excavation actually done and nothing extra
for the tree removal and sidewalk construction. Indeed, there is language in this contract, which if read
alone, could be construed to mean that payment of
such work as is listed in the Proposal shall constitute
payment for all work whether or not listed in the
Proposal. But from a reading of the contract as a
whole, it is clear that no such basis of payment was
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contemplated. Nor do the pleadings or findings by
the trial court indicate that such a basis of payment
was intended. (Note that Par. 5, First Cause of
Action of respondent's Answer states that "defendant
alleges that the 'Proposal' as contained in said written
Contract set forth the items, description, quantity, unit
price and total amount for the various portions of the
work to be done under the terms of the Contract.n
Again in Par. 8, "defendant alleges that the sidewalk
removal as a part of the excavation work covered by
the Contract was included within the terms of the
Con tract.'' (Emphasis added.)
The specifications cover in minute detail what
work is to be performed under each item in the Proposal, and the items in the Proposal include every single
item of work required to be performed under the contract with separate provisions for extras or force work,
with only one exception-there is omitted a bid item
for sidewalk removaL Nowhere does the contract give
notice or warning to the bidders that if any work to
be performed other than minor details and incidental
work is excluded from the Proposal, that such work
must be done without extra compensation. Nor has
respondent ever aserted that such was the intent of
the parties, but on the contrary, attempted to satisfy
this obligation by making payment on the basis of
the price to be paid for excavation of earth and rock.
From reading of the contract as a whole, and
from the pleadings and findings by the trial court,
one fact becomes unmistakably clear, and upon which
appellant's cause of action is predicated-that is, that
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it was the intent of the parties, both appellant and respondent, that the schedule of bid items should include
all work to be done under the contract (except for force
work which is separately provided for and except for
minor details and incidental work). The conclusion
is inescapable that the removal of old sidewalk was
omitted, either from the definition of structural excavation or as a separate bid item in the Proposal,
either through inadvertence or mistake.
It is stated in 13 C.J. 271 "A contract, it may
truly be said, includes not only what the parties actually write down or say, but all those things which
the law implies as part of it, and likewise all matters
which both the parties intend to express but do not'',
citing In re Pierce, etc., Mfg. Co., 231 Fed. 312, 320;
E. I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Schlottman,
218 Fed. 353, 134 CCA 161, and many others. A
discussion in Mace v. Cole, 50 N.D. 866, 198 NW
816. 35 A.L.R. 1391, is particularly apropos. This
was a case in which plaintiff was attempting to establish a lien under a lien law which allowed such
liens only where the "price agreed upon is definitely
fixed'' and the court, in holding for the plaintiff even
though no specific price was stated, said:
It does not follow from the mere fact that
the parties did not mention a definite price for
the threshing that a price was not agreed upon.
For a contract includes not only what the parties say, but also what is necesarily to be implied from what they say. Grossman v. Schenker, 206 N.Y. 466, 469, 100 NE 39. What is
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implied in an express contract is as much a
part of it as what is expressed. Bishop on Contracts (2d Ed.) Sec. 241; 13 C.J. 2 71. See,
also, sections 5915-5917, C.L. 1913. Thus,
in sales of personal property, not infrequently
the agreement in terms states merely that one
party will buy or that he will sell certain goods
without stating any correlative obligation on
the part of the other party. Williston on Contracts, p. 154. In such case the law supplies the
promise on the part of the purchaser to pay the
purchase price. If the parties have by any course
of dealing made it possible for a reasonable man
in their position to understand their intention
as to the price, it will be fixed by this understanding, based on previous course of dealing
as effectually as if stated in words. Williston
on Sales, Sec. 167. But, where the facts and
circumstances are such that it must be said
that the parties did not fix a price at all, or
provide any mode for ascertainment thereof,
the law implies a stipulation that the seller shall
sell at, and the buyer shall pay, a reasonable
price. Williston on Sales, Sec. 16 6, 1 71.
Consistent with the foregoing is the statement
of this Court in Cummings et ux v. Nielson et al, 42
Utah 157, 166, 129 P. 619. This Court said ''It
is a cardinal rule of construction that that which is
implied is always as much a part of any writing as
that which is expressed", and citing 2 Page on Contracts, sec. 1118, "Since a contract is to be construed
as a whole, terms which can be inferred from a consideration of the entire instrument are as much a part
of the contract as if expressly set forth therein". It
is appellant's contention that one of the "terms which
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can be inferred from a consideration of the entire instrument" is that payment is to be made for all major
work required by the contract, and that if no unit
price is shown in the Proposal, a reasonable price shall
be paid. In any case, the law implies that a reasonable price shall be paid in sueh circumstances.
There are only three possible hypotheses that
could account for the omission of sidewalk removal
from the Proposal. 1-The respondent, through inadvertence, simply failed to make any provision for
the price to be paid for this work. 2.-The respondent,
erroneously, believed that sidewalk removal was included in the definition of structural excavation. 3.The respondent deliberately failed to make any provision for payment for sidewalk removal with the
hope of getting something for nothing. In either of
the first two situations, it is clear that the parties intended that the appellant should be paid for this work
and the foregoing statements of law being applicable,
appellant is entitled to recover a reasonable price. Under
the third possibility, which appellant does not believe
to be the correct one, even if the contract were construed to mean that no payment was to be made for
work excluded from the Proposal. such a contract
would obviously constitute a fraudulent attempt to
mislead and deceive the bidders. In such a case, the
law is clear that appellant would be entitled to reformation of the contract to conform to what the appellant
was fraudulently induced to believe it to be. 45 Am.
Jur. 613, Reformation of Instruments, Sec. 51 et seq.
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II
If it had been the intent of the parties to include
sidewalk removal as part of the excavation, there
would have been no reason to specifically show on
the plans what sidewalk was to be removed.
Although the plans showed what old sidewalk
was to be removed, and appellant is chargeable with
knowledge that such work had to be done, since there
was no place to enter a bid for this work in the Proposal, and since the Specifications (Sec. 1.2.1 and 1.2.3,
infra page 13) indicate that no change is to be made in
the Proposal, and since the contract is a unit price
contract based on the quantities of work actually done
rather than a lump-sum contract, any reasonable person would certainly be entitled to believe that this
item was omitted through error and that payment
would be made therefore at a reasonable price or at a
price subsequently to be agreed upon. Support for this
belief is found in Sec. 1.2.8, "The bidder's attention
is called to the fact that the quantities of work to be
done and materials furnished under these specifications
as shown in the proposal are approximate only and
are for the purpose of comparing bids and fixing the
amount of bonds and that payment will be made only
on the basis of the above unit prices in the actual
quantities, as determined by the Owner's Engineer in
the completed work.
tt

If there is any inconsistency or ambiguity in the
contract in this regard, or if there remains any doubt
as to the intention of the parties, such doubt should
be resolved in favor of appellant.
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In Monnett vs. Monnett, 46 Oh. St. 30, 34,
the court said:
The words of obligation in a contract are
interpreted most strongly against the obligor
for it is presumed that he used those most favorable to his interests; and all doubtful terms or
ambiguous words are to be construed against
him. He who speaks should speak plainly, or
the other party may explain to his own advantage.
Numerous similar statements are to be found in citations in Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, sec.

37.
The following statement from Williston on Contracts, Sec. 621, citing many causes, is of particular
significance:
Since one who speaks or writes, can by
exactness of expression more easily prevent mistakes in meaning, than one with whom he is
dealing, doubts arising from ambiguity of language are resolved in favor of the latter ...
This rule finds frequent application to policies
of insurance which are ordinarily prepared solely by the insurance company, and the words,
therefore, are construed most strongly against
it.
Appellant believes that what is said about insurance companies is, equally applicable in the case
of most construction contracts. The contract is prepared solely by the owner or his engineer and the contractor has no voice whatever in the terms of the con-
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tract-he must take it as he finds it or not at all. In
this contract, Sec. 1. 2.1 of the Specifications provides
"The bidder must submit his proposal on the form
furnished by the Engineer. All blank spaces must be
filled in correctly where indicated for each item where
a quantity is given . . . ", and again in Sec. 1.2.3
"Proposals may be rejected if they show any omissions,
alteration of form, additions not called for, conditional or alternate bids, or irregularities of any kind."
(Emphasis added.)
CONCLUSION
It was the intent of the parties that the bid
schedule in the Proposal should comprehend all of
the work required to be done by the contract, and
that a bid item for removal of old sidewalk was
omitted through inadvertence or mistake, and that
since no price was agreed upon for this work, appellant
is entitled to a reasonable price. The trial court therefore erred in its determination that as a matter of law,
the sidewalk removal was included in the provisions
for structural excavation, and that the Amended
Judgment of the trial court for the respondent on
the First Cause of Action should be reversed with a
new trial granted for the determination of the remaining issues concerning accord and satisfaction and
determination of a reasonable price per square foot
for sidewalk removal.
R. J. RIMENSBERGER
Attorney for Appellant
404 Dooly Bldg.
Salt Lake City, U tab
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